Rebellion and the onset of conflict in 2011

In February 2011, approximately 15,000 fighters in eastern Libya rose up against long-standing dictator General Ghaddafi following the arrest of a prominent human rights activist (UK Parliament, 2016; Neale, 2018). Later dubbed the Benghazi Rebellion, the uprising occurred as part of a larger movement that demanded the upheaval of Libya’s political status quo during the Arab Spring (Walker-Cousins, 2022). In March, NATO began to militarily support the uprising against Ghaddafi with a bombing campaign. Conflict continued for several months with death toll estimates ranging from around 3,000 to more than 20,000 in 2011 alone (Foreign Policy, 2021; Daw et al, 2015). In October 2011, General Ghaddafi was killed in Sirte, in northern Libya. A fallout ensued, with the central government largely losing its grip on the country (USIP, 2019).

Libya’s protracted conflict sees factions gain power

Open conflict calmed after the National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed, making way for elections in 2012 and UN-brokered peace talks. In 2015,  the Libyan Political Agreement was signed, enshrining  the central Government of National Accord (GNA) into power (NTC Libya, 2023; Carter Center, 2012; UNSMIL, 2015).

However, armed groups continued to proliferate across Libya, undermining the authority of the central government. Jihadist networks bloomed, particularly in eastern Libya, where groups including and Ansar al-Sharia and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) found support, capturing cities including Derna.

Other militant groups included the forces of former Ghaddafi-ally and powerful armed group leader General Haftar. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted a coup against the General National Congress in 2014, accusing the internationally-recognised, elected government of harbouring terrorists. Haftar mobilised forces to defeat rival militias across eastern Libya, expanding his territories to vast portions of the east, including taking Derna from ISIS control (Council on Foreign Relation, 2023; Lacher, 2021, 4).

In 2020, the parties to conflict agreed to a permanent ceasefire arrangement (UNSMIL, 2020). While violence continued, it simmered at a significantly lower level than pre-ceasefire, relieving a portion of the humanitarian duress and enabling dialogue between rival powers. A Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap outlined a path to legitimate elections, planned for 2021. The vote was postponed, launching an uneasy stalemate (UNSMIL, 2023; Security Council Report, 2023).

Maintenance and adaptation were neglected for decades

Derna, a city of approximately 100,000 people in eastern Libya has felt the effects of Libya’s political turmoil acutely, in particular with regard to their ability to withstand extreme weather events[AD-a1] . Under General Ghaddafi, the city faced decades of marginalisation, with rebels at times rising up against his regime (Truitte, 2018). Critical governance provisions were lacking even prior to the outbreak of conflict, with infrastructure not adequately maintained.

The city was home to two dams along the Wadi Derna River, built in the 1970s and contracted for repair in 2007. The Turkish contracted construction company stated in 2012 that the necessary renovations were completed, however, there is no evidence that any repairs occurred (Hidrotehnika-Hidroenergetika, 2016; Yee, 2023). Conflict inhibited maintenance from 2011, and the government is also accused of embezzling the designated funds (Reuters, 2023; Gazzini, 2023).  

In 2014, Derna became ISIS’s first Libyan stronghold. The city remained under the grip of ISIS for more than a year, being ravaged by heavy fighting between various groups once the network lost control. (Meir Amit, 2016). Between 2018-2019, Haftar launched a large-scale offensive against the various groups including the Derna Protection forces (DPF) to capture the area and consolidate his control of the east, known as the Battle for Derna. (OCHR, 2019; McGregor, 2018; Salem, 2018). Vast portions of the city were damaged or destroyed.

Reconstruction funds were earmarked for Derna, however, the city’s mayor, a relative of General Haftar, was hounded by allegations of misappropriating such funds in 2021 (Lacher, 2023). Recovery efforts have been sparse, with general city upkeep lacking. Since, waste disposal has been poor, electricity has been unavailable for up to six hours a day, and many residents receive water from the public network just 1-3 days per week (REACH, 2019).

Mounting climatic pressures

Meanwhile, a host of climate change impacts festered in Libya including increased temperatures, extreme weather events, and sea level rise. Average temperature in Libya has already surpassed the 1.5ºC increase pledged in the Paris Agreement, and is predicted to rise to 2.2ºC by 2040. The country is facing extended periods of drought which are expected to worsen, with precipitation less frequent but more intense, consisting of bouts of extreme storms (Brubacher, 2021). In Libya, as in other conflict contexts, “immediate needs, protection, peacebuilding, and stabilisation actions” absorbed the bulk of government attention and resources over the past decade, “while responsibilities for promoting disaster risk reduction (DRR)” were neglected (Sitati et al, 2021). A 2022 report stated that the area around Derna’s dams had a “high potential for flooding,” with maintenance required (Ashoor, 2022).

Rainfall overwhelms Derna’s dams

In September 2023, Storm Daniel tore across the southern Mediterranean, causing torrential rainfall in Spain, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Libya. Made significantly more likely by climate change, the scale of rain that poured onto Libya amounted to somewhere between a “1-in-300 to 1-in-600-year event” (World Weather Attribution, 2023). Rainfall accumulated in the Wadi Derna River’s dams, where engineers failed to release the excess water in time to reduce pressure (Al-Ansari, 2023). Local officials had also underestimated the risk and did not undertake evacuation efforts, advising citizens to stay in their homes (where many would be trapped) (BBC 2023).

In the early hours of September 11, the water mass led to the collapse of the dams, rushing 30 million cubic metres of water into the city (Motamedi, 2023). Flooding destroyed approximately 25% of Derna, sweeping large portions of the city into the sea (DFS, 2023). Initial figures counted more than 5,000 dead, with estimations rising to more than 20,000 in the subsequent days (OCHA, 2023; Reuters, 2023; Loveluck, 2023). Ranging figures are largely attributable to the vast numbers of missing people, still amounting to some 10,000 as of late-October 2023 (UNOCHA, 2023).

Unrest heightens in the aftermath of the flood

Libya’s leaders were reticent in accepting their accountability for the collapse. In the days following the disaster, speaker of the Haftar-aligned House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh appeared on television in the days following the disaster to state that it was a “natural” catastrophe, that no one party can be blamed for (Lacher, 2023). Meanwhile, Derna’s mayor and other officials were arrested on negligence grounds (Reuters, 2023). Furious about the dam neglect and the failure of the local authorities to evacuate, Derna’s civilian population took to the streets in their hundreds in the week following the flood, with groups torching the mayor’s home (Bloomberg, 2023). In response, the LNA ordered international journalists to leave the region and shut down communications city-wide (Megrisi, 2023; Reuters, 2023;Glinski, 2023). Clashes erupted several weeks later in Benghazi, leading to civilian casualties, and communications were shut down again (UNSMIL, 2023).

The disaster prompted a fraught and complex response between the internationally-recognised government and the LNA, comprising of cooperation between the warring powers as well as conflict escalations. At the time of writing, building a consistent recovery path for Libya that does not aggravate conflict and fortifies the nation’s infrastructure against climate impacts remains a critical challenge.

Between cooperation and escalation: How conflict is shaping recovery

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the internationally-recognised government sent aid to Derna, delivering 80 doctors, body bags, and fourteen tons of medical supplies to the Haftar-controlled regions, raising hopes for future relations between the groups (BBC, 2023). The government also announced aid transfers for reconstruction and handouts for the victims (El Pais 2023).

In a briefing to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in October 2023,UNSMIL leader, Abdoulaye Bathily, noted that armed groups on both sides “demonstrated remarkable solidarity,” in the flood response (UNSC, 2023). The warring LNA set up an operations facility to support rescue teams, with Libyan civilians expressing an “outpouring of unity,” in the wake of the crisis (UNSC, 2023; UNSMIL, 2023).

However, UNSMIL noted that “severe governance deficits,” also became evident in the wake of the crisis (UNSC, 2023). The LNA blocked U.N. aid teams from entering Derna and created bottlenecks in hope of appearing in control of the situation (Guardian 2023; Glinksi, 2023).  

Frameworks for response

In light of the humanitarian catastrophe and ongoing cleavage between Libya’s political stakeholders, the Security Council unanimously voted to extend its mandate in Libya on October 30, 2023 (Security Council Report, 2023). The resolution (2702) aims to further a peace process rooted in the Libyan Political Agreement and the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap, recognising that “protracted conflict and political division in Libya has made the country more susceptible to the humanitarian impact of… the adverse effects of climate change” (Security Council Report, 2023).

The UNSC called upon Libya’s political actors to ensure a comprehensive and unobstructed humanitarian response, however, the likelihood that the disaster will push stakeholders to cast aside their conflict objectives is dubious. Access limitations imposed by Haftar’s regime have inhibited a robust assessment of the response, indicating that conflict calculations are taking precedence over humanitarian action.