In August 2010, the Indus broke its levees in southern Punjab, leading to some of the worst flooding in almost a century. The floods affected over twenty million people, displacing at least ten million and led to the deaths of almost two thousand. The aftermath saw mass protests against the government and World Bank for what people perceived as poor flood risk prevention. In Punjab, clashes broke out as protests targeted those deemed responsible for their exposure to the disaster. Anti-elite sentiment and anti-government demonstrations persisted long after the floodwaters subsided and many protests took place throughout Pakistan, including in its capital, Islamabad.

Extremely destructive floods

The first half of 2010 was the warmest in Pakistan since records began. Unusually high glacial runoff pushed the rivers and levees to their limits. Combined with some of the heaviest monsoon rains in decades, the effect was intense flooding throughout the Indus River Basin in the provinces of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkwa, Punjab and Sindh. The floods led to the death of almost two thousand people and, at their peak, covered one fifth of Pakistan's land mass (Disasters Emergency Committee, 2015). The waters took many months to recede and the aftermath had lasting impacts on livelihoods. Many hectares of arable land were inundated (sometimes deliberately to distribute floodwaters) but while some farmers gained compensation for lost income, most of the rural population that were affected (often smallholders or landless farmers) were not compensated (Budhani & Gazdar, 2011).

Inequalities and anti-elite sentiment in Punjab

In the months following the floods, community groups mobilised to articulate political demands to the government. They called for reduced inequalities between landed and landless people in terms of environmental protection and resource access (Ahmad, 2018).

Some also accused the government and the World Bank of negligence. Upstream sediment deposition at the Taunsa Barrage was identified as a risk to the ability of dams to mitigate flood risks, which led the World Bank to fund a major redevelopment project to address the problem in 2005-2008. However, the necessary actions to raise levees did not take place, leaving people vulnerable to the extreme surges of water as seen in 2010 (Ahmad, 2018; Gaadi, 2010).

Grievances also arose from the fact that flood levees had often been erected to protect the property of landed and politically better-connected elites (Mustafa et al., 2017). It was alleged that the way in which the floods spread via inundation shielded areas with crops associated with powerful people, even though some of these areas were specifically designed to absorb floodwaters. At the same time, many high-ranking officials, including senior figures in the engineering sphere, had dismissed the concerns raised by local “non-technical” people in the lead up to the floods (Ahmad, 2018). Indeed, some engineers in Punjab claimed that issues of water infrastructure should not be politicised (Gaadi, 2010).

Protests, blockades and hunger strikes targeting elites from both within and outside Pakistan were organised. In the capital of Islamabad, demonstrations took place outside government buildings and the offices of international financial institutions (Ahmad, 2018). It signalled a political and pointed movement addressing the political conditions that were responsible for the increased flood vulnerability of the less privileged social groups.

Climate change and related challenges

Climatic changes are thought to have partially contributed to an increasing intensity of floods in Pakistan. Studies show that there has been a long-term trend towards more intense summer rains in the core monsoon regions of Pakistan, which may have led to the 2010 floods (Chaudry, 2017; Wang et al., 2011). Meanwhile, some models predict heavy rains during the monsoon to become more irregular, further challenging Pakistan’s ability to address potential flood risks (Stolbova, et al., 2016).

Long-term trends also indicate that the Himalayan Glaciers, which feed the Indus basin, are receding (Raj K. et al., 2017). These glaciers are likely to continue receding in the coming years: projections show that glaciers in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region could shrink by more than one-third under a 1.5°C rise in global average temperatures by the end of the century (Bolch et al., 2019). This is likely to increase water flow in the short-run especially during the summer months (Jayaram, 2016), further compounding the potential risks of floods.

Relief efforts

Following the floods, the disaster response was coordinated primarily by Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) together with other government ministries and the army. Additionally, the international community provided relief aid, including water purification kits, medicine and food. By the end of 2011, the early recovery phase of the floods was accomplished, albeit with limitations in resources due to the onset of more floods in 2011 (NDMA, 2011: p.38). The United States was the largest contributor to humanitarian aid, followed by private donations from individuals and organisations (Reliefweb, 2010).  Agencies such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies and the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund also provided shelter, food and water aimed at supporting short-term service provision (Murtaza, 2010; Spaak & Rehman, 2011), while the Hirrak Development Centre funded by Action Aid worked with social movements to meet other demands (Ahmad, 2018). Government actions thus set in place the groundwork for people to return gradually to their rural livelihoods, and while these efforts, together with those from the international community, were partially successful in addressing grievances, many other emergency and long-term needs were not met.

Influence on Pakistan's climate adaptation policy

The 2010 floods also left an impression on Pakistan’s future climate action plans, culminating in the 2012 National Climate Change Policy and the 2014-2030 Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy, both of which aim to mainstream climate change into Pakistan’s development policies (Shah, 2018). The floods were mentioned several times in both documents, with the latter outlining specific priority and short-term plans to address infrastructural damages caused by the floods (ibid).

Response planning through the NDMA

The year 2010 also saw a revision of the National Disaster Management Act and the formulation of a National Disaster Response Plan, which gave the institutional mandate to coordinate disaster management strategies at the national level to the NDMA. The aim was to create a single all-encompassing national disaster management legislation to improve disaster response and the dissemination of relief and aid. The longer-term aim is to mainstream disaster risk management into development policies to ensure that new policies take into account the particular vulnerability of certain populations (NDMA, 2011).

Improving early warning systems

That said, further improvements are necessary. Towns and cities in Pakistan are generally better informed of flood risks, but many are often still unprepared. Some have suggested making Pakistan’s flood management institutions more open and transparent. The technocratic language that is used by Pakistani authorities in flood warnings makes it difficult for the addressees to properly assess the risk they are exposed to, and can add to the idea that the government is letting down the people and not adequately warning them (Mustafa et al., 2017). Current approaches of the NDMA still focus on urban and coastal areas that may be affected by tsunamis (see NDMA, 2018; 2017), The development of a wide-reaching rural early warning system reaching out to remote communities and using easier language could further improve Pakistan’s disaster preparedness.

Improving infrastructure, data and legislation

Improving drainage infrastructure may mitigate the negative effects on communities in the wake of floods. Infrastructure may also be aligned with rigorous environmental data and current climate predictions to address changing levels of risk. This may also include updating legislation based on recent data and information. Some have suggested that outdated historical data was partly responsible for the insufficient level of safety of water infrastructure in 2010 (Mustafa et al, 2017: p.23).

While dams are often presented as necessary flood risk mitigation measures, there is limited evidence that they prevent or could endure shocks incurred in the context of climate change (Mustafa et al., 2017). Moreover, dam-building often entails political challenges between communities, regions and countries (for example, see Kalabagh Dam Conflict).

Addressing inequalities and improving vulnerability assessments

Inundation zones are areas flooded intentionally. A problem arises when landed people in inundation zones receive compensation, while landless people do not. Compensation for loss of livelihoods, especially among the landless, may reduce possible anti-state sentiment in the wake of floods. Similarly, timely drainage would allow people to return to their homes and livelihoods sooner, reducing tensions brought by displacement. This would imply the improvement of vulnerability assessments to determine who is most at risk prior to floods, which could be integrated with early warning systems (Mustafa et al., 2017).