Conceptual Model
Conflict history
Strategic and historical importance of the Shatt al-Arab
The Shatt al-Arab river is formed by the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Iraq. The river constitutes the border between Iraq and Iran on the last 50 miles of the river flowing down to the Persian Gulf (Francona, 2001). Being the only access point of Iraq to the Persian Gulf, the Shatt al-Arab has a strategic importance for the country’s transportation and exports. Moreover, given the arid climate in this part of the Middle East, the water from the river is crucial for agriculture (ICE, 1998).
Although Iran has other accesses to the Gulf, a high quantity of crude oil produced in Iran is transported through the river. Moreover, Iran is highly dependent on the Tigris tributaries for hydropower and irrigation, the developments of which threaten downstream agriculture, fishing and drinking water in the Shatt al-Arab basin (Chomani & Bijnens, 2016).
In addition, the Shatt al-Arab symbolises a cultural and historical line between both countries, being a boundary between Persians under a Shia government and Arabs under a Sunni government (ICE, 1998). It was also a point of contention between the Ottoman and Persian empires for centuries as both empires sought to gain control of the river (Francona, 2001).
20th century agreements and tensions
In 1937, with support of the League of Nations, Iraq and Iran concluded agreements over the delimitation of the Shatt al-Arab (Karsch, 2002). Even though these agreements managed to appease bilateral relations momentarily, they never eradicated tensions present in the region, with both countries engaging in a race for power to defend their perceived rights in the following years.
In the 1960s, Iran started scaling up its military capacities in order to defend its sovereignty rights over half of the river. The country’s military capacity eventually became far superior than that of Iraq, in part because of the latter’s internal political changes around the same period (ICE, 1998). Iran’s growing regional power culminated in its unilateral withdrawal from the 1937 treaty in April 1969, to which Iraq declared a “blatant violation of international law” (Karsch, 2002).
At this point, both countries were on the verge of conflict, particularly as Iran was providing military support for the Kurds who were seeking autonomy in the northern part of Iraq (ICE, 1998). This was averted in 1975 when both countries concluded the Algiers Agreement under the initiative of Algerian President Houari Boumédiène, in which Iraq acknowledged Iran’s sovereignty over half of the river, in exchange for an end to Iranian support for the Kurds (Francona, 2001; ICE, 1998; Karsch, 2002).
By using this strategy of linking the water dispute to the Kurdish issue, Iran succeeded in bringing back Iraq to the negotiation table and to get the latter to recognise Iran’s sovereignty claims (Pipes, 1983). The fact that the 1975 agreement recognised Iran’s co-sovereignty over the river was, however, seen as “humiliating” for Iraq, who eventually withdrew from the treaty in 1979 when Iran’s military was scaled down following the Iranian Revolution (Karsch, 2002; Pipes, 1983). This set the stage for the war between Iran and Iraq that would later erupt in 1980 (ICE, 1998).
The 1980-1988 war
While the Shatt al-Arab dispute was one of the factors that led to the 1980-1988 war, it was not the only one. Iraq had long wanted to take control of the oil-rich province of Khuzestan at the border with Iran. Furthermore, the territorial dispute over three Persian Gulf islands seized by Iran in 1971 and the fear of Iran’s new Islamic revolutionary government fostering rebellion amongst Iraq’s Shia majority contributed to tensions (Pipes, 1983).
During the war, approximately one million people were killed and over a million were displaced (UNEP, 2003). The conflict also inflicted considerable damages to the environment and contributed to destroying livelihoods. The war saw the deployment of chemical and biological weapons, with short- and long-term impacts on both human health as well as on crops, livestock and ecosystems. Moreover, the destruction of date palm forests along the Shatt al-Arab estuary – once the largest in the world – as well as major oil spills in the Gulf due to the targeting of oil infrastructure, have also been attributed to the war, with consequences to both agriculture and fisheries in the region (UNEP, 2003).
Conflict resolution
Ceasefire despite the unsettled Shatt al-Arab dispute
After eight years of conflict characterised by heavy human, environmental as well as economic consequences, both parties accepted a ceasefire brokered by the UN (UCDP, n.d.). Nevertheless, even though Iraq and Iran put an end to violent hostilities, both parties publicly indicated immediately after the ceasefire that they had not changed their positions regarding the status of the Shatt al-Arab (Wallace, 1988).
The ceasefire did not therefore succeed in settling the Shatt al-Arab dispute. However, in fall 1990, shortly after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq and Iran restored diplomatic relations and began implementing provisions of the ceasefire, including a return to pre-war borders along the Shatt al-Arab (UCDP, n.d.). This move, initiated by Iraq, must be understood in the wider context that, following the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had lost support from the West – who tacitly supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. On the other hand, by multiplying diplomatic initiatives, in 1989 Iran had succeeded in restoring normal diplomatic relations with France, Italy and Germany, and prospects of improving relations with the United States were boding well (Tarock, 1998). Fearing that such rapprochement could lead to an alliance against itself, Iraq withdrew its troops from occupied Iranian territory – which Iraq occupied despite the ceasefire – and agreed on a division of sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab with Iran, as well as an exchange of prisoners-of-war (Tarock, 1998). The Algiers Agreement was, however, not reinstated.
Later developments
Although bilateral diplomatic relations improved after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the following Iraqi governments kept the strong position that Iraq would never reinstate the 1975 Agreement (Hunter, 2014). Tensions also remained over the Shatt al-Arab due to Iran’s water development projects upstream, which were a major water source for Iraq’s agriculture downstream. In 2004, Iraq’s Ministry of Water Resources voiced opposition to Iran’s diversion plans (UN-ESCWA & BGR, 2013).
However, since the beginning of the war in Syria as well as the rise of the Islamic State Group (ISIS) in large parts of Iraq in 2014, relations between Iraq and Iran have considerably improved (Dawood & Geranmayeh, 2019; Hunter, 2014). This has been reflected on the Shatt-al Arab issue. In 2014, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of both countries met to discuss how to delimit the river borders in a mutually acceptable way and to put an end to the status quo, including aspects of water protection and environmental conservation (Iraq Business News, 2014). This perspective of cooperation is very timely, as reports point out worsening water quality levels and their hazardous threats for both health and agriculture (Myers, 2010).
Relations were further strengthened following former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s official visit to Iraq in March 2019. During his visit, in addition to signing several preliminary trade deals, both countries announced their “serious intention” to implement the 1975 Agreement on the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab border (Dawood & Geranmayeh, 2019).
Despite improvements in bilateral relations, upstream development projects in Iran, including dams, river diversions and canals, continue to affect downstream river flow, leading to recurrent diplomatic disputes between the two countries (Adib, 2022; Travers, 2021).
A broader outlook
Future discussions and agreements over the Shatt al-Arab river should make sure they are not restricted to the river itself. Instead, agreements should address the broader impacts of upstream water infrastructure development in other downstream regions in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, and include not just Iran but also Turkey where development projects have also contributed to Iraq’s water scarcity (Pawson, 2021). Such considerations are important as water access - and the severity of water scarcity - of Iraq’s downstream populations heavily depend on future water resource management in upstream countries like Iran and Turkey (Hassan et al., 2018; Mueller et al., 2021).
Moreover, temperatures are expected to rise in the southern part of the Euphrates-Tigris basin where the Shatt al-Arab lies – some estimates project a rise of up to 1.2°C in the next 30 years (Mueller et al., 2021). Rainfall is also expected to decline, along with the growing threat of sea level rise and saltwater intrusion – indeed, the Shatt al-Arab has been identified as one of the world’s deltas most at risk to sea level rise and flooding (Mueller et al., 2021). Hence, water stress along the Shatt al-Arab, which is already extremely high, could worsen under these projections (Mueller et al., 2021).
In the face of such risks, close cooperation on water management of the Shatt al-Arab and the wider Euphrates-Tigris basin is of paramount importance. To date, there are no formal regional cooperation agreements in the basin, with water-sharing issues being addressed on an ad-hoc basis (Hassan et al., 2018). Failure to establish cooperation agreements could revive tensions between the co-riparian states, as well as trigger social unrest domestically, as was seen in 2018 in the southern Iraqi city of Basra where residents protested against poor water quality and service provision (HRW, 2019).
Resilience and Peace Building
Treaty/agreement
Agreements signed in 1937 and 1975 temporarily averted tensions that were escalating between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab river throughout the 20th century. After the 1980-1988 war, relations between Iran and Iraq have considerably improved, with both countries announcing in 2019 their “serious intention” to implement the 1975 Agreement on the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab border. However, to date, there are no formal regional cooperation agreements in the wider Euphrates-Tigris basin, with water-sharing issues being addressed on an ad-hoc basis.
Resources and Materials
- Adib, M.J. (2022). Iran, Iraq exchange accusations over water flow. AL-Monitor. [Access date: 23.12.2022].
- Chomani, K. & Bijnens, T. (2016). The impact of the Daryan Dam on the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Save the Tigris and Iraqi Marshes Campaign. October 2016.
- Dawood, H. & Geranmayeh, E. (2019). When Iran goes to Iraq: The significance of Rouhani’s trip. ECFR. [Access date: 23.12.2022].
- Francona, R. (2001). Iran-Iraq: Role of the Shatt Al-'Arab. Commentary.
- Hassan, K. et al. (2018). Iraq. Climate-related security risk assessment. Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks.
- HRW (2019). Basra is Thirsty: Iraq’s Failure to Manage the Water Crisis. Human Rights Watch (HRW).
- Hunter, S. (2014). What Iran Wants in Iraq And Why. Lobe Log. [Access date: 23.12.2022].
- ICE (1998). Iran-Iraq War and Waterway Claims. ICE Case Studies.
- Iraq Business News (2014). Iraq-Iran Talks on Borders, Shatt al-Arab. [Access date: 23.12.2022].
- Karsh, E. (2009). The Iran-Iraq War. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group.
- Mueller, A. et al. (2021). Climate change, water and future cooperation and development in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. CASCADES Research Paper.
- Myers, S.T. (2010). Vital River Is Withering, and Iraq Has No Answer. The New York Times. [Access date: 23.12.2022].
- Pawson, M. (2021). ‘All the trees have died’: Iraqis face intensifying water crisis. Al Jazeera. [Access date: 23.12.2022].
- Pipes, D. (1983). A Border Adrift: Origins of the Iraq-Iran War. In: Tahir-Kheli, S. & Ayubi, S. (eds.). The Iraq-Iran War: Old Conflict, New Weapons. New York: Praeger, 3-25.
- Tarock, A. (1998). The superpowers' involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Commack, N.Y: Nova Science Publishers.
- Travers, A. (2021). 'Nothing but PR': water ministry advances taking Iran to court. Rudaw. [Access date: 23.12.2022].
- UCDP (n.d.). Iran-Iraq. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. [Access date: 15.12.2021].
- UNEP (2003). Desk Study on the Environment in Iraq. Nairobi: UNEP.
- UN-ESCWA & BGR (2013). Chapter 5: Shatt al Arab, Karkheh and Karun Rivers. In: Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia. Beirut.
- Wallace, C.P. (1988). Iran, Iraq Still Fail to Bridge Waterway Dispute. Los Angeles Times. [Access date: 23.12.2022].