Decades of civil war and military intervention have left Afghanistan in a desolate condition. In rural areas, in which nearly 70% of the Afghan population lives, roads, schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure are often either absent or of poor quality (Leao et al., 2018). This undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government and strengthened the Taliban insurgency (Johnson & Mason, 2007).

Before the Taliban takeover in 2021, the military and police, solely responsible for upholding state authority since the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 2014, struggled to hold controlled territory and had difficulties filling up their ranks, whilst suffering high casualties. The Taliban, on the other hand, found it much easier to recruit new fighters, especially in rural areas (Jones, 2015), giving them the ability to wage and win, in 2021, a war of attrition against the Afghan government. Before Taliban rule, the reasons for young men to fight against government forces were diverse but often connected to either religion and ideology or political neglect and a lack of economic opportunities (Johnson & Mason, 2007). The latter often stemmed from poor service provision, especially in rural areas, and limited access to water resources.

Prior to Taliban takeover (pre-2021)

Lacking economic prospects driving recruitment for the Taliban 

Many Taliban fighters were religiously or ideologically motivated. These men usually served as full-time fighters and were indoctrinated in religious boarding schools, often in the Afghan-Pakistan border region. Anti-imperialistic (especially anti-American) grievances were usually paired with religious fundamentalism. However, many also joined for pragmatic, economic or circumstantial reasons. Prior to Taliban takeover, the abuse of civilians, body-searches on women and other hostile actions by governmental forces and government-friendly militias were further drivers of radicalisation (Jones, 2015; Landinfo, 2017).

Others joined the insurgency because they were suffering from poverty and poor access to basic services such as electricity and water. For many young Afghans, economic prospects were bleak, especially in rural areas where 53% of youth are illiterate (Leao et al., 2018). Corruption, ineffective administration, insecurity, and destruction of property due to continued fighting in some areas further compounded this problem (Leao et al., 2018; Transparency International, 2018). Agriculture, which was (and remains) the main activity in rural areas, is unreliable, due to low selling prices, persistent insecurity, and destroyed irrigation infrastructure, among other reasons (Leao et al., 2018).

Joining the Taliban became a viable option under these circumstances; even more so than joining the national army or police (Jones, 2015). Pay for soldiers of the former Afghan national army and police was irregular and sometimes lower than salaries for Taliban fighters (Landinfo, 2017). Many Taliban supporters were recruited on a ‘part-time basis’ which meant that they would “(…) ‘fight for a couple of hours in the morning’ and then go home for other activities – ‘in the field or in the bazaar’ (…)” (Landinfo, 2017).

Furthermore, trust in the government as a provider of security and essential services eroded in many rural areas as a result of corruption and poorly performing public administrations. In 2018, Afghanistan ranked 172/180 on the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2018). This created further incentives for joining the Taliban insurgency. This was particularly visible in the water sector, where poor planning and deficient irrigation infrastructure exacerbated economic hardship and anti-state grievances (Jones, 2015; Johnson & Mason, 2006).

Poor access to water and deficient infrastructure

Water is essential to rural livelihoods in Afghanistan, since the country’s economy relies heavily on agriculture and related sectors, such as food processing, trade, and agro-industry (Leao et al., 2018). Farming is usually also the primary source of income for people who return to their villages after having fled violence during the civil war. Yet the absence or poor condition of irrigation infrastructure, often a result of the war, is a major challenge for them (Majidyar, 2018; Burt & Keiru, 2014; McCarthy & Mustafa, 2014). In fact, Kuonqui et al., (2011) estimated that the amount of irrigated surfaces in Afghanistan fell from about 3 million hectares in the 1970s to 1.8 million hectares in 2011.

Deficient infrastructure and access to water also lead to sanitary and health problems. Despite significant reconstruction efforts in the water sector, only 40% of the rural and 71% of the urban population had access to safe drinking water in 2016 (USAID, 2016). A significant share of income is lost as a result. As a villager explained: “Half of our income every year is spent on doctors and medicine because we are always getting sick with stomach complaints and diarrhoea” (Burt & Keiru, 2014). This contributed to the conditions that facilitated recruitment by the Taliban.

Water management as a key challenge

Formal and customary institutions struggled to address the above problems, which further undermined trust in the state and customary resource management.

The patchy and incomplete implementation of formal water management, frequently combined with a lack of understanding of the customary system among government officials, resulted in confusion about the distribution of tasks and responsibilities between formal and informal water management institutions. Ultimately, this undermined both (McCarthy & Mustafa, 2014).

Since the former national government was virtually absent from many rural areas during the civil war, customary water allocation institutions (Mirabs) were often co-opted or violated by warlords. This further undermined the capacity of customary systems and impeded effective water management (McCarthy & Mustafa, 2014).

Another major disadvantage in management capacity and effectivity building was the lack of hydrological data. Data collection was already difficult in pre-war times but became close to impossible during the three decades of war (Palmer-Moloney, 2011; Campbell, 2015).

The Taliban takeover and its aftermath

In August 2021, the Taliban swept into power with a speed that took the international community largely by surprise (Smith, 2024). As US and NATO forces completed their withdrawal, the Afghan National Security Forces collapsed and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ceased to exist. The Taliban declared the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and assumed control of the entire country. 

This has led to a shift in the Taliban’s role within the country – it is now itself the governing authority rather than a non-state insurgency force, and with that comes responsibility for the very services whose absence it had leveraged for recruitment and legitimacy. 

Collapse of the development architecture and institutional framework

The fall of Kabul triggered an immediate and severe disruption to the international aid and development framework that had sustained much of Afghanistan's water and sanitation infrastructure. The United States froze approximately $9.5 billion in Afghan central bank reserves held in the US (Boghani, 2021). The World Bank, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund suspended development aid and disbursements. An estimated $3 billion in international water and sanitation funding was frozen (Amini, 2025). 

The consequences were felt rapidly. Planned and ongoing projects – including groundwater recharge schemes and the development of urban water infrastructure – were suspended and remain so (Kumar, 2025). International technical staff left the country, and many Afghan professionals in water engineering, hydrology, and public administration followed, creating a severe brain drain that continues to strip the sector of technical capacity. For instance, when the Taliban took over, government-employed irrigation experts withdrew from facilities such as the Dahla Dam in Kandahar Province (The Water, Peace and Security Partnership, 2021). Even when asked by the Taliban to return to the dam to ensure water flows to farmers, the experts did not do so, thereby leaving flows from the reservoir interrupted and threatening crops.

The institutional framework built over two decades by the previous Afghan government – the Water Law, the river basin agencies, and more – has been largely abandoned by Taliban governance structures (Malyar, 2023). While the Taliban’s Ministry of Energy and Water is nominally responsible for water governance, its technical capacity, transparency, and adherence to prior regulatory frameworks remain unclear (Mahaqi, 2025). Research conducted between 2022 and 2024 on Taliban local governance found that while the movement initially sought to engage with community elders and existing local structures, grievances have since emerged over the behaviour of Taliban-appointed officials, such as extortion and preferential treatment in the distribution of humanitarian aid (Giustozzi & Nemat, 2025).

Despite these challenges, some international actors continue to operate. In February 2024, the World Bank took first cautious steps towards a revised development approach, though progress remains limited (Runde et al., 2024). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has continued to carry out projects despite Taliban rule, rebuilding much needed infrastructure in urban areas such as Kabul, Herat and Kandahar (Armentrout, 2025). This has improved access to water for more than 1.1 million people. In May 2025, the United Nations also allocated $16.6 million to help reduce the effects of drought in north and northeastern Afghanistan – although further funding is still required to prevent large-scale displacement and further deterioration of food and water security in those regions (UNOCHA, 2025). While humanitarian aid continues to be sent to the country, it is also dwindling overall due to donor fatigue and cuts to US aid under President Trump (International Crisis Group, 2025).

Worsening water-related transboundary tensions 

Afghanistan's water challenges extend beyond its borders. Since 2021, Taliban-led infrastructure projects, the absence of formal water-sharing agreements, and mass deportations have contributed to rising tensions with neighbouring states and intensified water security concerns.

Qosh Tepa Canal

One significant development is the Qosh Tepa Canal. Construction of this 287-km irrigation canal in northern Afghanistan began in 2022, designed to divert water from the Amu Darya to irrigate arid land. Phase one was completed in October 2023, and by mid-2025 phase two was reportedly over 80% complete (von Schwerin, 2025). However, the canal lacks concrete lining, and a section collapsed in 2023, flooding more than 30 km² of surrounding land. The project has raised concerns among Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, who face growing water stress and depend on the Amu Darya for agriculture and drinking water. The Taliban has not engaged in any regional water-use agreements, and no mechanism currently exists to negotiate equitable allocation (Ibragimova, 2025).

Frictions between Afghanistan and Pakistan

To the south and east, the shared Kabul river basin, which feeds tributaries to the greater Indus system, remains a source of friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The two countries have no formal water treaty and divide water based on customary practices. In October 2025, Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada ordered the construction of a dam on the Kunar River, further straining relations amid already heightened border tensions (Afghanistan International, 2025). Bilateral relations have deteriorated sharply since late 2025, with sustained border clashes escalating into what Pakistan has described as a state of 'open war' by early 2026, driven primarily by disputes over the harbouring of militant groups (Bajpaee, 2026). This breakdown has made any prospect of cooperation on shared water resources increasingly remote.

Tensions with Iran

Relations with Iran have also been volatile, with whom Afghanistan has also long had disputes over water. In May 2023, border clashes between Iranian and Afghan forces over the Taliban's alleged restriction of Helmand River water flows resulted in casualties on both sides. Iran considers these flows vital for agriculture in its eastern Sistan-Baluchestan Province (United States Institute of Peace, 2023). Water commissioners from both sides have been unable to reach agreement in multiple meetings since 2021 (Faizee & Schmeier, 2023).

Population pressures

These tensions between Afghanistan and its neighbors are compounded by significant population pressures. Since October 2023, Pakistan has forcibly returned approximately 600,000 Afghan nationals, while Iran has deported some 700,000 (International Federation for Human Rights, 2025). In 2024 alone, at least 1.2 million Afghans were forced to return from the two countries (Karimi, 2025). Most returnees lack adequate shelter, income, and access to food, clean water, and healthcare, placing additional pressure on Afghanistan's already strained resources (ACAPS, n.d.). The influx is concentrated in provinces that are among the hardest hit by drought, further intensifying competition over diminishing water supplies.

The aggravating potential of climate change

Since 2021, Afghanistan is experiencing a continuous drought. Kabul's water supply, fed by rivers drawing on snowmelt from the Hindu Kush mountains, is under severe strain, with winter precipitation falling significantly below average in recent years (Kumar, 2025). The 2025 drought has been described as one of the worst in a decade, affecting over half the country and causing widespread crop failures (World Food Programme, n.d.). Groundwater depletion is accelerating the crisis. Kabul's aquifers have declined by 25 to 30 metres over the past 10 years (Bennett, 2025).  A 2025 Mercy Corps report warned that Kabul could become the first modern city in the world to run out of water – potentially by 2030 (Kumar, 2025).

The consequences for food security are severe. An estimated 20 million Afghans are food insecure, with 6 million facing famine-like conditions (Malyar, 2023). Climate-related disasters and displacement have also intensified. Nearly 3 million people were displaced between 2021 and 2024, and in 2024 alone, 988,000 individuals experienced temporary displacement due to climate disaster events (IOM Afghanistan, 2025). Severe flooding in May 2024 worsened the hunger crisis, and widespread flooding and avalanches in early 2025 affected five million people by mid-year (UN News, 2024; Afghanistan International, 2025). Major earthquakes in 2023 and 2025 have further compounded displacement pressures (IOM, 2025). 

Challenges to the water sector in Afghanistan could be further amplified by climate change. Predictions show that temperatures in Afghanistan will rise by 3°C to 7°C by 2100 leading to scarcity of water and desertification in arid and semi-arid areas. Unpredictable seasonal water flow patterns due to changes in glacial melt could lead to more extreme weather events such as floods and droughts. By augmenting pressure on water resources and undermining rural livelihoods, climate change could thus accelerate the vicious cycle of poverty, recruitment by insurgent groups, and violence (Bishop et al., 2014; Scherer & Taenzler, 2018).
 

The above explanations suggest that improvements in water availability and management through infrastructure and legal frameworks, including agreements with neighbouring countries and measures to increase the overall resilience of the water sector, could not only have a positive impact on water security and livelihoods, but also have the potential of mitigating internal conflict and transboundary tensions. 

The programmes, institutions, and partnerships described below were developed under the previous Afghan government between 2001 and 2021. While many have since been suspended, dissolved, or restructured under Taliban governance, they remain relevant as a record of what was achieved, what has been lost, and the resulting new approaches required.

Addressing water issues in rural development

Under the former Afghan government, water issues in rural areas were addressed foremost in the National Solidarity Program (NSP) (Black, 2017). Infrastructure development, strengthening of local governance mechanisms and preventing possible conflicts were key goals of the NSP. 

Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, the NSP and its community development councils (CDC)s have effectively ceased to function in their original form (Yar & Baidar, 2025). Taliban-appointed structures have displaced many of the community-based programs that previously channeled investments into local water infrastructure, worsening the access to such services (Smith, 2024). In the current context, addressing water issues in rural areas primarily means working with neutral actors (such as remaining NGOs like the ICRC) and with customary mechanisms like the Mirab to keep basic services running and mediate disputes where possible.

Building institutional capacity

The former Afghan government developed a decentralised Integrated Water Resource Management approach that promoted the participation of local leaders in decision- making processes. (Afghan Ministry of Justice, 2009; Shroder & Ahmadzai, 2016).

Yet, corruption remained a major challenge. The former government’s anti-corruption measures were largely viewed as inefficient or not existent. Even anti-corruption officials were believed to be compromised by corrupt networks (Tiefer, 2018).

Since the 2021 Taliban takeover, most of the institutional architecture for water governance, including river basin agencies and advisory bodies, has been effectively dismantled or weakened. The Ministry of Energy and Water nominally persists but is led by political appointees with limited technical background (Mahaqi, 2025). Technical staff have left in significant numbers, weakening the capacity of the de facto authorities to manage water disputes. Under these conditions, conflict mitigation currently focuses less on further institution-building at the national level and remains more about preserving remaining technical capacity, and providing external technical support through international organisations, so that minimum standards for allocation and safety can be maintained and water-related grievances do not escalate. As of 2025, Afghanistan still remains among the most corrupt countries, according to the Corruption Perception Index. Its ranking of 169/182 (Transparency International, 2025) suggests the continued persistence of corruption as a major challenge under Taliban governance.

Irrigation infrastructure and water management

To improve the condition of water infrastructure, numerous projects of varying scale were conducted by the former Afghan government and supported by international institutions like the World Bank, of which many were part of the NSP program or supported by it. One of the most important projects was the Irrigation Restoration and Development Project (IRDP), which aimed to improve small scale irrigation infrastructure. NGO participation in redevelopment was high. Between 2010 and 2014 alone, 891 international and local NGOs were active in Afghanistan, of which 158 were active in the field of WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), and 147 in infrastructure (Mitchell, 2017).   

Since 2021, many  programmes have been suspended or scaled back, as development aid was frozen and foreign technical staff withdrew. However, some water related infrastructure work continues under Taliban rule, such as the work by the ICRC. In the absence of broad national programmes like the IRDP, targeted repairs and service delivery projects by remaining NGOs are a key conflict mitigation tool, helping keep wells and urban networks functional in the most drought affected and displacement affected areas, and reducing local competition over scarce water. At the regional level, international organisations can also contribute to de escalation by supporting dialogue around large Taliban led projects such as the Qosh Tepa Canal.

Improving hygiene and sanitation

International organisations such as UNICEF, WHO, and Red Cross have been long present in Afghanistan and have helped improve disease resilience through e.g. chlorination of shallow wells and distribution of chlorine tablets and medical equipment, as well as health and water hygiene education (Kakar et al., 2008).

A large number of small, village-scale WASH projects were bundled within the Rural Water, Sanitation and Hygiene project, a 30 million USD initiative jointly launched in 2016 by UNICEF, USAID, and the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (USAID, 2016).

Since the Taliban takeover, many development oriented WASH projects have ended or shifted into emergency mode, and the ban on Afghan women working for NGOs and the UN has constrained outreach to women and girls (OCHA, 2023; UN Women, 2023; Nemat, 2023) . Nevertheless, UNICEF, the ICRC and a smaller number of NGOs still operate WASH programmes, focusing on chlorination, emergency repairs and hygiene promotion in areas hit hardest by drought and displacement (UNICEF, n.d.). In this context, hygiene and sanitation interventions have a conflict mitigating function less by building state legitimacy and more by preventing disease outbreaks and humanitarian deterioration in already fragile communities.

Climate change adaptation

Few international projects have directly addressed the effects of climate change in Afghanistan. Nonetheless efforts were made in the 2010s, such as the “Building adaptive capacity and resilience to climate change” project (2013-2017), which was cofounded by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). The program aimed at strengthening institutional capacity and building sustainable water infrastructure, as well as hydrological data collection to support risks mitigation in the water sector (UNFCCC).

Another major program was conducted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), building government capacity to integrate risk and impact assessments into development plans at the local level in four provinces (UNDP, n.d.). It further trained locals in disaster response and promoted climate-resilient crops among other measures. Since the 2021 Taliban takeover, most dedicated climate adaptation programmes supported by multilateral funds and UN agencies have not continued.

The former Afghan government also made efforts to strengthen resilience to climate change  through national programmes like the NSP and the Irrigation and Restoration Development Project (Heinrich Boell Stiftung, 2016). However, under the current Taliban rule, there is currently no comprehensive national framework for climate resilient water management (Greenfield & Dickie, 2024; Mayar, 2025). Some smaller EU funded NGO projects on climate resilient agriculture and local water management have started since 2023, but they remain limited in scope and are implemented without formal partnership with the de facto authorities (European Commission, n.d.). This means that the adaptation agenda has shifted from building long term, state led resilience towards a more modest goal, which includes helping exposed communities cope with drought, flooding and groundwater decline so that climate shocks do not translate directly into livelihood collapse and displacement.