Yemen’s long history of political instability

Yemen has faced recurring cycles of political instability starting from the colonial era, its division into Northern and Southern states, the 1994 civil war, up until the popular ouster of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011 and the ensuing civil war (Mohammed 2020). Local disputes over the distribution and ownership of water and land resources are spreading and often turn violent in the context of the ongoing civil war. As of April 2024, the Tehran-backed Zaidi Houthis continue to assume power over the majority of Yemeni cities, while the IRGY, backed by Saudi Arabia, remain in control over Ma’rib and Shabwah cities (EIP 2024).

The protracted fighting influences and is influenced by multiple environmental and economic drivers. According to the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, the prolonged armed conflict between the Houthis and the IRGY has become inseparable from the fight over economic wealth including natural resources use and management (Lederer 2023). This means that mismanagement and weaponization of water and land resources came into play as a military tactic by all parties to put pressure on each other (Barry et al. 2024).

Water scarcity and violent conflict

The agricultural sector employs more than 63 percent of the Yemeni population, making water, essential for irrigation, a key resource for livelihood security (Zabara et al. 2022). Water scarcity in Yemen is arising from its visible lack of surface water areas resulting in over dependency on its groundwater sources. Within an unstable landscape of war, aquifers are getting more and more depleted due to inadequate resource management and exploitation by warring parties. Climate variability adds to this equation; desertification and erratic rainfall diminishes water availability and ultimately leads to competition over water (Zabara et al. 2022).

As was already explored in a previous case study, community conflicts which in most cases were closely tied to water scarcity have been present in the Yemeni society across all governorates long before the civil war erupted. These conflicts sometimes turn violent when whole communities are involved in taking up arms against one another over water access contributing to approximately 4,000 deaths per year (UNESCO 2012). This is manifested, for instance, when farmers divert water away from downstream users, prompting downstream communities to take up arms against the farmer and/or his community, leading to long cycles of intercommunal violence (Barry et al. 2024). The ongoing civil war increased the civilian population’s access to and use of arms and weapons, leading to more violence around water points, particularly against women and girls; as they are traditionally responsible for water collection in the family (Aklan et al. 2021). For instance, clashes have erupted in urban hubs such as Sana’a and Aden when some women filled more water cannisters than permitted (Zabara et al. 2022). In their long journeys to fetch water, women and girls are often more exposed to the risk of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), killing in landmines or being shot by snipers (UNDP 2023; Partners Global 2023). Also, in the Saber area of Taiz, the Qurabah and Marzoh villages have been engaged in violent conflict since 2019 over the ownership of a well rendering at least 200 injured and 20 killed (Barry et al. 2024).

In addition to these existing water disputes, groundwater extraction processes are increasing the risk of violence around water sources. While the National Water Resources Authority (NRWA) is the mandated governmental body that oversees water-drilling and distribution laws in the country, almost 99 percent of water extraction in Yemen remains unlicensed (Al-Saidi 2024) – which creates further grievances between local communities. For instance, conflict parties and wealthy landowners have taken advantage of the unregulated water management procedures and positioned themselves as alternative service providers for groundwater extraction, relying on a consistent supply of energy that currently only they can provide (Climatediplomacy 2009; IRENA 2023; FEWS NET 2022). By doing so, underground water resources that are now monopolised by those who have access to energy for extraction and have become weaponised. By providing (or denying) access to underground water, conflict parties are wielding additional power and prolonging the conflict, as well as undermining Yemeni communities that lack the necessary means to access water on their own. Exacerbated by climate impacts such as torrential floods, frequent droughts and rainfall variability and unpredictability, water scarcity is increasing, heightening the dependence on private groundwater extraction controlled by military factions. 

This weaponisation of water resources can also be seen in the city of Taiz, where the IRGY and Houthi forces clashed over control of a water infrastructure in the city centre, ultimately making it a military target and inevitably exacerbating the water crisis in the city (Wilson Center Staff 2024). Water infrastructures including pipes and water tanks were also targeted by the Saudi-led Arab coalition in their strikes on Houthi-controlled areas, leaving many Yemenis, especially farmers, unable to water their crops and thus resulting in abandonment of agricultural land and livelihood loss (Risi et al. 2024). 

Displacement and land-related challenges driving insecurity

An important aspect to the civil war is the surge in internal displacement of Yemenis amounting to almost 14 percent of the population so-far (UNHCR 2024). This shift has sparked tensions over land use between displaced people and host communities in many Yemeni cities including Ma’rib, Taiz and Sanaa’ (Barry et al. 2024). Additionally, climate-induced desertification and flash-floods prompted the re-displacement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), making them more vulnerable in the face of prolonged war and increasing climate impacts. For instance, conflict-induced IDPs face an extra burden of re-displacement when IDP sites are in flash floods-prone locations (ACAPS 2023). This is visible in many Yemeni cities including Al Jawf, Marib, Shabwah, Al Bayda, Ibb, and Amran where IDPs who are already on the move due to the conflict are forced to relocate because of the frequent flooding (ACAPS 2023).

Additionally, 80 percent of disputes in Yemen are land-related resulting in around 4 thousand violent deaths annually (Alaghbari 2022; USAID, n.d.). Tensions over land ownership and use are affiliated with Yemen’s history of unclear property rights and challenges regarding land transactions and registration. Often validated through customary urf by sheikhs, land transactions in most Yemeni cities do not have a statutory registry, thus creating overlapping claims to land areas (Alshuwaiter 2021). For instance, citizens who buy land from the state might need to repay for it to settle with private/tribal claimants in major cities including Sana’a, Aden, Taiz and Mukalla (Alshuwaiter 2021). Processes of dispossession, land grabs and inequitable distribution of land also took place across the country for decades, with little success in reforming land governance or returning the land to its previous owners (Barry et al 2024). Within the current context of the civil war, this intensifies tensions between displaced people and host communities, both claiming land rights and evoking contending land transaction evidence.

Environmental impacts are equally resulting in severe land degradation, leading to livelihood depletion and adding to the vulnerability and exposure of the war-torn Yemeni population (USAID 2017; LANDac 2019; Mohammed 2023). This heavily impacts arable land disputes and conflict as a result of recurring climate impacts such as floods and desertification as well as the civil war. Almost 12 million hectars of arable land was lost due to soil erosion in the last 10 years (USAID n.d.). Frequent cyclones have also reduced arability of agricultural land in major southern cities including Abyan, Shabwah, Hadramawt, Al Mahra and Socotra Island (Barry et al. 2024).The shifting of plot borders due to changes of the physical environment over time through rainfall fluctuations also fuels agricultural land disputes between different families and communities in Yemen (Alaghbari 2022). 

On the sub-national level, no overarching or state-wide system is implemented to cope and deal with water and land-related disputes. Establishing such a system is of course particularly difficult in the context of the civil war (Barry et al. 2024). Structural fragilities and administrative challenges related to historical land transaction and land rights compromise Yemen’s court effectiveness, which render disputes unlikely to be resolved before outbreaking into violence (Barry et al. 2024). Additionally, the justice system has not been successful in resolving disputes over land and property ownership, which make up almost 50 percent of overall court cases in Yemen, with many cases remaining in the system for decades (LANDac 2019; Alaghbari 2022). Accordingly, Yemen’s customary governance and mediation systems take the lead in most land and water disputes rather than court systems The role of local leaders in land conflict mediation and resolution has been historically respected in Yemeni communities and cannot be overstated. Although currently undermined by the civil war and the structural challenges associated with conflicts, these mechanisms remain the most reliable source of legislation amidst the current instability. Women-led mediation and peacebuilding initiatives have also played instrumental roles in conflict mediation. Albeit not directly related to water and land disputes, they ensured access to humanitarian services and secured the return of missing persons, which contributes to a general cessation of hostilities between the conflicting parties, including around water and land issues. While women remain incapable of owning land and property in customary Yemeni law, this empowerment of the role of women in conflict resolution and mediation highlights the transformative changes undergoing in the Yemeni societies. However, these good practices have not (yet) been recognized or replicated in other contexts such as track one mediation for instance, leaving a gap in local mediation unfulfilled (InclusivePeace 2022). 

That being the case, a national peace process would be a prerequisite to resolving this local-level conflict. The first nation-wide ceasefire since the break-out of the war was agreed in April 2022 (Loft 2023). After being renewed two times, the warring parties failed to reach an agreement and the violence resumed in October of the same year. After the ceasefire, the violence had not returned to the same level again but instances of violent attacks between the Houthis and the IRGY continue at the time of writing (Lederer 2023). In 2023, Peace talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia were rekindled thanks to Omani brokerage (Aljazeera 2023), which led to the biggest prisoner swap since 2020 in April 2023 (Berg 2023). However, the late-2023 escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip and the Houthi response campaign targeting Israeli, US and UK shipping in the Red Sea over the course of 2024 renders the status and durability of the peace talks unclear (Ghwaidi 2023).  

Local and national level mediation have also been lagging. Many Yemenis do not know whom to approach when disputes over climate and environment-related issues arise. Even when such an entity or person is identified, people do not feel enabled to approach local authorities on questions or disputes relating to the environment. There is also a perceived lack of knowledge about available national authorities designated for this purpose (EIP 2024). Therefore, it is unlikely that a local level mediation process would result in tangible outcomes for peace.