By Vicken Cheterian, a journalist and political analyst who works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva.

The single desperate act of an unemployed university graduate living in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid sparked the recent wave of civil unrest leading to the January 2011 overthrow President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime.

The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi has been echoed in other parts of the Arab world. In Algeria, riots and demonstrations in protest against steep rises in the cost of basic foodstuffs (the price of sugar and cooking oil, for example, went up by 30 percent on 1 January 2011) forced authorities to rescind the increases; and protests continue in Egypt and elsewhere, even in the face of deaths and injuries, as initial unrest has broadened into demands for greater freedom.

The explosive combination of mass unemployment and rising food prices threatens societal stability in other parts of the Arab world. Jordan too witnessed violence on 3 January in a jobs-related dispute between two rival tribes in the southern city of Maan, which led to three deaths, dozens wounded, and over 90 arrests. A few days later, an inter-tribe clash took place in Karak. The government took urgent measures (including cancelling taxes) in order to reduce market prices, while the United States government sent an emergency grant of $100 million to help the Jordanian authorities stabilise the markets and ease social tensions.

The food-energy-water nexus

The urgent measures being taken by these Arab governments are necessary. But they remain short-term solutions, while the underlying problem is structural and will only get worse. A World Bank report published in 2009 stresses that Arab countries import more than half their food, and that they are the greatest importers of cereal in the world. In other words, Arab countries depend on other countries for their food security, which makes them as sensitive to floods in Australia and big freezes in Canada as on the yields in their own countries.

In 2009, Arab countries' food imports cost $30 billion. Rising prices in global markets from mid-2008 already caused waves of rioting in dozens of countries around the globe, and also left millions of unemployed and impoverished people in Arab countries even more exposed.

The demographics of the Arab world add to the problem. The population increased fivefold during the 20th century, and growth continues at an annual average of 2.3 percent. This demographic revolution of the past century occurred in parallel with the Green Revolution in agriculture, whereby technological innovations and the industrialisation of agriculture increased food production. The availability of oil was crucial to the Green Revolution's success. But a number of factors now suggest that this progress has reached its limits. For example, rising oil prices were a major cause of the global food-price spike in 2008. An International Energy Agency (IEA) report published in November 2010 says that "peak oil" could already have been reached.

The dilemma of Arab economies is that they depend on oil prices (whether as oil producers or as countries dependent on petro-dollar investments) while higher energy prices make their food more expensive.

With regard to land and water resources, the two basic components of agriculture next to energy, the situation is little better. Industrialised agriculture, massive use of pesticides, and the loss of topsoil has led to widespread land degradation and lower yields. Global water resources are also heavily invested: most major rivers are already dammed for irrigation and hydropower, their number currently being 45,000 and with only limited further capacity for harnessing major rivers.

Many Arab countries, such as Jordan in light of the fall of Dead Sea levels, are in water-deficit; they are now using non-renewable water - as well as non-renewable energy - for agricultural production.

Climate change is an additional source of uncertainty, and it will have major negative impacts on agriculture in the Arab world. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change forecasts that during this century, shifts in rain patterns could lead to decreases in rainfall of up to 20 percent in the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, a rise in temperature of 2-4 degrees means more evaporation and even less water availability. Some climate models predict that several rivers could simply disappear with such changes.

In combination, these trends will lead to increases in demand for energy, food, and water, while hydrocarbon-based industry and agriculture will simultaneously have difficulty expanding.

Environment and security

What does all this mean for stability of political systems in the Arab world? It is difficult to say, due to a lack of hard understanding. Research on the linkages among environment degradation, resource depletion and political systems is new. For example, it is not clear whether there is a relationship among Arab demographic growth, new urban environments, the emergence of marginalised but educated youth, and the rise of specific types of Islamic militancy.

The signals are mixed, making a country-wide picture somewhat unclear. But at the level of the individual, and of many individuals acting together, there is greater clarity. In Tunisia, Mohamad Bouazizi did not rebel because he did not find a job reflecting his ambitions and education. He did not burn himself when a police officer confiscated the fruits and vegetables he was selling at a street-corner on the pretext he had no permit. But when he went to file a complaint to seek justice, his request was rejected. It was this feeling of injustice that led Mohamed Bouazizi to his desperate act.

This article in a longer version was first published at the website “Open Democracy”.

Published in: ECC-Newsletter, 1/2011