In September 2009 Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti has taken a new cross government post as Climate and Energy Security Envoy for the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The editors of the ECC-platform took the chance to talk with him about his new position.



ECC: Mr. Morisetti, from the German perspective, this is a quite innovative approach, so could you shortly explain the rationale behind the establishment of this new position and what your principle responsibilities and objectives are, please?



Neil Morisetti (NM): In the debate on climate change, people looked for a long time only at the environmental consequences. I studied the subject in the 1970s and it was very much an environmental issue. I think that particularly in the past few years we have begun to realise that the consequences of climate change are more than just environmental impacts. There are socio-economic, political and security issues. In 2007, the UN Security Council held a UK-led debate on security implications. About the same time, a number of think tanks started to produce work. One paper, which probably launched the debate in a sense, was produced by the Center for Naval Analysis in Washington on the national security implications of climate change.



About the same time, in 2008, our UK national security strategy mentioned this issue for the first time. So, a document, endorsed by the Prime Minister, recognised climate change as the potentially greatest threat to global stability and security in the future and therefore to national security. And when you start talking about national security then Defence starts to get engaged in the process. In a revision of this strategy last year we talked about climate change as a threat multiplier. And I think this is increasingly how it is seen. That is to say, climate change in itself is unlikely to start a conflict. But it could well be the tipping point or the catalyst for conflict, particularly when you look at where the greatest impact from climate change is likely to be felt and that is coincidental with those regions already suffering from multiple threats. By that I mean resource issues such as shortages of food and water, health issues, and financial challenges. Often they are also in areas with weak governments or low resilience. We have seen small or various sizes of conflicts in those regions in the past and it may well be that climate change will accelerate or accentuate that problem.



ECC: So, conflicts will not be a direct consequence of climatic changes?



NM: What we are looking at really are not the physical changes of climate change but the implications of the second or third order consequences.  Temperature rises, increased salinity in the sea, water shortages etc. lead to failed crops, failed harvests, loss of fish stocks, loss of land. What will people do? They have lost their livelihood, they have lost their home. How do they behave? Do they look towards alternative livelihoods, which may or may not be legal? Do they look to move, either within countries or between countries? This is the element that has a potential bearing on global security. Consequently, the UK established my position in September 2009. The decision was made to use a serving military officer, because much of this involves engagement with the military, internationally. If you have two people of the same profession, it is easier to talk and to engage than if you are used to different thought patterns.



But what we also came to was the run up to Copenhagen. It was important to encourage governments when they were forming their position for Copenhagen, not only to consider the environmental, economic and political perspective, but also to listen to the departments of defence and be aware that there are security implications: unless we can hold it to a less than 2 degree world, the risk to security will increase, and increase considerably, and become slightly unpredictable as well. So since then I have been engaging in the international community, not just with military and defence but also with foreign affairs, environment, the economic side, think tanks. I have been engaging in the UK defence community and also across government departments. Climate change doesn’t necessarily recognise departmental boundaries any more. It doesn’t recognise national boundaries. So, on the policy side it means broadening and deepening the understanding. What does it mean with regard to potential missions and tasks for defence? In a sense, it could be humanitarian activities in response to extreme weather events, which are not necessarily at the other side of the world but could well be in our own countries. I am thinking of the recent heavy rains in the UK in December, which in one county alone caused damages estimated at more than 100 million pounds. The military were there in a certain rescue role with helicopters, rebuilding bridges so that people could move around, restoring infrastructure.



ECC: Does that mean that climate security focuses mainly on disaster management?



NM: At the other extreme is conflict resolution in cases of conflicts where climate change may be a factor. But perhaps more likely is engagement as one of a number of actors and probably performing quite a small role but nonetheless a key role in conflict prevention, in developing resilience and capacities. Especially in those countries I talked about, where the potential threats and multiple stresses—including climate change—are greatest. At the same time, there is the challenge of adaptation. Climate will continue to change because of what we have done in the past, regardless of what we do today. And we need to be sure that we have the ability to operate and deliver those missions and tasks in the second quarter of the 21st century. It might be a more rugged environment and we might find that we have to change our equipment because the temperatures are hotter.



But also, and this is where the energy element comes in, virtually all of our military equipment requires diesel or petrol. As we move further into the 21st century this energy is going to become increasingly rare or scarce, and likely to become much more expensive. And this makes us vulnerable. We need to try to reduce that vulnerability. We need to reduce our energy demands. We have to be more efficient in the way we use our energy. We must look for alternative energy and renewables. That brings advantages actually. All these things pose challenges but also offer opportunities. If we could reduce the amount of fuel we use at our operating base in Afghanistan, for example, we could reduce the number of convoys we need. That reduces the threats to life, it reduces our vulnerability, and brings financial savings as well.



Finally, climate change is in part a result of human activity and emissions of green house gases, CO2 etc., and defence bears a responsibility like everyone else. We have to reduce our emissions. In the UK we’ve got a Climate Change Act that was passed in 2008 and contains target reductions of about 35 percent by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. Defence must reduce its emissions. We produce about 1 percent of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions at the moment. We have a carbon budget that we have to live within. We have to demonstrate how we will reduce our emissions year on year in order to do that. Some of that comes from the estate, from the buildings, the way we manage our property, and some of it comes from fewer emissions from fighting equipment. Reducing the latter takes slightly longer, because you get involved in new ways of being more effective and using alternatives. But those are the sort of areas we are addressing. Again there are opportunities. If you find yourself using perhaps more synthetics in training and simulation, you have to buy less equipment and you are using less fuel. That represents a saving. And there are technology advances that should not impact on your ability to conduct training. We still need live training before operations but you can focus that more effectively.



ECC: So there are also benefits when addressing the challenge of climate security?



NM: Many of these areas present opportunities for collaboration—not just among the military internationally, but between the public and the private sector, with other departments, organizations or agencies. But the sort of thing we need to look at, and recognising that we are still in a learning phase, is that we need to get a better understanding of what those second and third order consequences are; how humans react to them; and when they are going to happen. It’s like any other threat. You have some indicators and some sort of an early warning system. And then we probably need to do more work to understand more about the science, more about the solutions. Because when you can do that, then you start to look at it—rather than being some great unknown—as one of a number of threats that we are facing in the future. It is not the only one. But we are able to make informed decisions about what it means for us. And where appropriate take risks. By risks I mean that we may decide not to take action in certain areas now, because we think technology will assist us in the future. Or our level of confidence about something that might happen may be lower in one area than it is in another and we might need to address the high impact relatively early. Energy is again an example. Energy security is important. We know fossil fuels will peak at some point and we need to be doing research and development into alternative sources. We must ensure that we understand the consequences of doing that, so that we do not find ourselves developing things that have unforeseen consequences and potential damage to the environment or affect people’s livelihoods. First-generation biofuels are an example.



ECC: Do you think that there are specific priorities when it comes to certain regions that are at risk?



NM: A broad spread of countries is currently at risk: especially, but not exclusively, the Tropics of Capricorn and Cancer. If I talk to colleagues in countries like Bangladesh, Lesotho and other places, they tell me that they have already seen the effects of climate change. And we need to be alert to that. In other areas perhaps, the effects might not come for 5, 10, 15 years. The low-lying islands are an example, the Indian Ocean and Pacific. We should address this issue on a collaborative basis in organisations like the EU. Many of us EU Member States have historical links with other countries and we should try and use those as best as we can in order to assist. Because you are bringing together a mixture of development aid, development of capabilities in countries, some of which are security, some of which are completely different, trying to develop infrastructures. And where there are historical links then it’s worth trying to exploit those links to make best use of them.



ECC: Can you tell us more about the relevance of climate security for national security planning and the development of national security strategies?



NM: Yes, I think you may have heard from the NATO Secretary General—he spoke at Lloyds in London at the beginning of October—saying we don’t know everything about this yet but we do know enough to know that we need to do something. And we need to encourage nations to engage, to factor this into their national security strategies and their defence strategies. As I said, it is in the UK strategy. We published our Defence Green Paper last week in which we talked about climate change as being one of the five major trends that will affect the future strategic environment. At the same time we published a piece of work by the Defence Concept and Doctrine Centre, which expands on what we mean by that and how we see it occurring and where it might impact. Also in the public domain, the United States have recently published their annual defence review which covers both climate and energy security and the links between the two. The two in a sense are natural bedfellows in that point. At the same time, NATO is doing work on a strategic concept and again is looking at the context in which we will find ourselves operating in the future. So all of these things should and are factoring in climate change as one of those issues.



ECC: But there are also arguments, e.g. from the development community, that there are already too many priority areas such poverty reduction, gender etc. that need to be considered.



NM: But they are not mutually exclusive issues. There are ways of actually addressing both of these things. When you are looking for states and partners, you factor in where climate change may well have its greatest effect. It becomes now one of these factors you have got to consider in your strategic thought process. There are reasons why it affects more than just one or two departments. For example, in the UK we are trying to reduce our emissions from our defence buildings and we are the second largest land owner with something like 240 000 acres of land, 4 000 defence sites and 46 000 buildings. Actually there is much that we can learn from, and offer to, other government departments, such as health and education, when they are constructing their buildings. And we can work with them to look for best practices. This is reducing the cost of doing research because we only need to do this research once and then it has multi-use. In light of the UK’s national debt, this can only be beneficial.



ECC: You already mentioned that in the run-up to Copenhagen there was also a need to engage the defence community to discuss the relevance of climate change for this area. Copenhagen is widely perceived as a disaster. Do you think that a change is needed in the overall climate security debate as a result of Copenhagen?



NM: Copenhagen was not bad. It was disappointing. We didn’t achieve a legally binding treaty. But I think we have made some progress. We have made progress in the sense that there is a recognition that we should strive for a 2 degree world. There is a recognition that we need to set targets for emissions reductions. There is recognition of the requirement and a process for review and verification and there is a third development in the sense of aid. I think we must continue to reinforce the understanding that there are security implications to climate change, and that if we do not take action to achieve that 2 degree scenario, then those consequences become particularly severe. And they don’t just become severe in the countries where we look today for climate change, they will have an impact in northern European countries and they will have an impact in North America, etc. You may have seen the study that the UK produced on the 4 degree world, which was launched last autumn. If you look at the temperature rise in cities like Berlin, London, Washington in the summer—the London underground already struggles on a hot day. So it is important that we continue to reinforce that message and that the defence community joins in discussions with the Environment Ministers and the Heads of Government. I think, at the same time, we must start taking action and leading by example, hence to implement the programme we have adopted in the UK.  At the end of the day, there is a process that requires UN engagement and all of the nations of the world. Some of it might perhaps be done by taking regional ownership. And there is a similarity between what we’ve got in maritime security. It is a global problem but if you take regional ownership of the issues, the product of all of that is for the benefit for everybody.



ECC: Mr. Morisetti, thank you very much for the interview.

The interview was conducted by Dennis Taenzler and Christiane Roettger.



Further information on the "4-Degree-Map" of the Met Office Hadley Centre is available at http://www.actoncopenhagen.decc.gov.uk/content/en/embeds/flash/4-degrees-large-map-final



The Green Book of Defence and the study of the Defence Concept and Doctrine Centre are available at

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/StrategicTrends+Programme/TheDcdcGlobalStrategicTrendsProgramme.htm

Published in: ECC-Newsletter, February 2010