Climate finance is notoriously difficult to quantify due to varying definitions and ambiguous reporting rules, giving providers significant discretion over what counts as climate finance. Studies have shown that providers use reporting practices that overstate the actual level of climate finance, relying on generous assumptions about the climate relevance of projects and the way different financial instruments are valued. Most climate finance is delivered through loans rather than grants, increasing debt burdens in low-income countries, and these loans are counted at their face value without considering the actual financial effort of providers or repayment obligations. 

Oxfam’s Climate-Specific Net Assistance (CSNA) seeks to provide a more accurate reflection of the actual financial effort made by provider countries in support of climate-specific action in developing countries. This approach accounts for both the climate relevance of reported finance and the grant-equivalent value of the instruments used, and indicates that the actual financial effort by developed countries to support climate action in developing countries is vastly lower than the officially reported figures seem to suggest

Climate finance needs far exceed current flows. Top-down assessments estimate that emerging and developing countries (excluding China) require around US$2.4 trillion annually for climate and nature-related investments. Bottom-up estimates based on needs reported in NDCs and other climate plans total US$455–584 billion annually by 2030, though these figures probably underestimate the real finance required. The case studies demonstrate that received climate finance is insufficient compared to needs, particularly for adaptation, leaving vulnerable countries unable to respond adequately to climate impacts. Loss and damage finance, especially for non economic impacts, remains uncosted, underfunded and poorly tracked. 

Across several of the studies, a lack of transparency is identified as a major barrier to understanding how gender objectives are integrated in climate finance, particularly among the multilateral development banks (MDBs), which are not required to assess or report on gender objectives when submitting climate finance data to the OECD. Where data is available, it reveals a consistently low level of integration of gender objectives.

The case studies highlight top-down decision-making models in climate finance, which sideline civil society and marginalized groups, and reduce the relevance of climate projects. The participation of civil society in some cases is reported to be superficial, with grassroots actors engaged too late or only symbolically, which can undermine the effectiveness of climate finance in meeting local needs.

Additionally, both national and local actors, particularly civil society and groups representing marginalized communities, face major obstacles to accessing climate finance. Multilateral funds are particularly inaccessible due to complex and resource-intensive accreditation and application processes, high requirements, and co-financing obligations. Civil society organizations (CSOs) often work with limited budgets, and lack both an awareness of climate finance opportunities and the capacity needed to navigate complex funding systems. Information gaps further restrict access. The studies further highlight that fragile and conflict-affected states face even greater challenges due to state-centric international frameworks, implementation risks, weak governance structures, and the risk-adverse approach of many climate finance providers.

Most countries now have at least one climate change policy or strategy in place. These frameworks, including NDCs and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), are important to establish climate and development priorities, identify finance needs, attract resources, and inform budget and resource allocation. To enable mobilization and allocation of funding, plans should be costed, have realistic financing scenarios, and be directly linked to the budget and other sources of funding. They should also link to broader development goals, such as poverty reduction and gender equality. Ethiopia offers a useful example of how gender considerations can be incorporated into national climate planning and, while decided gender and climate change plans are not yet widespread, Nigeria’s National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change is one example that aims to integrate gender into national climate change initiatives. 

Alongside climate plans, several countries, such as Uganda, have implemented or are developing national climate finance strategies to guide the mobilization, coordination and management of funding. These strategies identify priority areas and funding sources and define roles and institutional responsibilities. 

Institutional and governance arrangements influence a country’s readiness to mobilize and manage climate finance and support the integration of planning and budgeting processes. Effectiveness depends on mandates but also on expertise and capacity to coordinate, communicate and engage across levels. Understanding these structures can help to identify opportunities for civil society to leverage influence and engage in accountability and monitoring of climate finance. In some countries, a specific ministry is mandated by decree or law to lead on climate change or climate finance. Ministries may also house climate change departments, directorates, units or desks, as seen in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Uganda, and some countries, such as Uganda, have established dedicated Climate Finance Units (CFUs). Inter-ministerial coordination bodies and national councils such as those in Ethiopia and Timor Leste play a role in fostering collaboration across stakeholders while parliamentary structures, such as the Parliamentary Forum on Climate Change in Uganda, can also facilitate accountability. 

Findings in Nepal and Ethiopia, however, highlight challenges in the governance of climate change and climate finance, including institutional fragmentation, overlapping mandates, and weak coordination across ministries and levels of administration in Ethiopia, and, in Nepal, limited integration of climate change into sectoral programmes, capacity constraints, and the absence of a dedicated body to oversee climate finance.

Across countries, various mechanisms exist to involve civil society at the national level, such as Nigeria’s National Council on Climate Change, Tuvalu’s National Advisory Climate Change Committee, multi-stakeholder platforms such as Senegal’s national climate change adaptation platform for agriculture, livestock and fishing, and ad hoc consultation processes such as those convened by the Ministry of Environment in Mali. The case studies also demonstrate how CSOs can use platforms with shared objectives to coordinate their efforts and engage more effectively with key stakeholders. For example, the Shifting the Power Coalition works across the Pacific to build the capacity of women leaders to engage in national disaster coordination mechanisms, organize and influence decision-making. 

While these examples demonstrate that structures and participatory mechanisms exist across several countries, the studies also reveal significant challenges that hinder meaningful and equitable participation in climate-related decision-making and budget processes, particularly for marginalized groups. The studies show that participation frameworks may be weak or inconsistently applied, engagement can be superficial, and smaller or grassroots CSOs frequently remain excluded. Socio-cultural norms further constrain the meaningful involvement of women and other marginalized groups. CSOs also face capacity, information and resource constraints that limit their ability to analyse climate finance, participate in budgeting, and influence decision making. Nonetheless, several civil society-led tools and coalitions, such as monitoring platforms, disability working groups, and participatory research initiatives, demonstrate the opportunity for participation.

Integrating climate finance into public financial management systems ensures that funds flow efficiently and transparently through the budget cycle. Countries like Nepal and Uganda have made progress through frameworks such as Nepal’s Climate Change Financing Framework and Uganda’s citizens’ alternative budgets and the Certificate of Climate Change Responsive Budgeting to ensure budget allocations align with climate goals. The case study in Nigeria, on the other hand, highlights that climate change has not yet been fully integrated into public financial management systems, at least in a way that allows tracking and assessment. 

Transparency is essential to holding governments to account for their climate commitments. Citizens and CSOs must be able to track how climate funds are allocated and spent and the results they achieve. Several countries, including Ethiopia, Nepal, Uganda and Nigeria, have implemented or are in the process of implementing budget tagging – a tool that enables national and sub-national governments to track spending on climate adaptation and mitigation by defining and applying climate-specific categories or tags to public expenditure. 

It is important that information on climate-related budgeting is made available and accessible to the public. However, findings in Ethiopia, Indonesia and Nigeria show that this is not always consistently achieved. In this context, CSOs play a crucial role in promoting transparency of climate finance information, improving public comprehension of budget processes and encouraging meaningful engagement. In Uganda, CSOs publish an annual Citizen’s Guide to the Budget and supplements on climate finance in newspapers, and participate in pre- and post-budget conferences and television and radio dialogues.

Barriers to locally led action identified in the case studies include weak institutional and governance arrangements, misalignment between national and sub-national policies, limited technical and financial capacity, high access requirements, top-down decision-making by providers, and lack of transparency in tracking funds. These challenges constrain the ability of local communities and CSOs to participate meaningfully, access resources, and implement climate solutions tailored to local needs.

Nonetheless, initiatives such as Nepal’s Local Adaptation Plans for Action, Uganda’s Devolved Climate Finance mechanism, the LoCAL programme, and Kenya’s FLLoCA show progress in decentralizing finance and supporting locally led adaptation. The experiences and lessons from these initiatives, alongside the Principles for Locally Led Adaptation, can inform the design of decentralized climate finance mechanisms.

Civil society actors play a vital role in shaping, implementing, monitoring and evaluating climate projects, plans and budgets, including NDCs, and ultimately meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. As the examples highlighted in this briefing paper demonstrate, there are many possibilities for civil society actors to hold governments accountable, represent communities, and bring local knowledge to climate solutions. CSOs are particularly well positioned to work at the local level: they understand community priorities and context, can highlight issues overlooked in national dialogue, and help translate national policies into effective, context-specific measures. By acting as a bridge between government and communities, they can amplify local voices and ensure that climate action reflects community needs. They can help communities to organize, build capacity at the local level, and identify, prioritize and communicate needs and solutions. 

There are, however, considerable barriers that limit civil society participation and decision-making in climate change decisions and action. Overall, climate finance systems remain complex and poorly aligned with the needs and capacities of local actors. Efforts need to be made to build the capacity of CSOs, simplify funding arrangements and build genuinely inclusive engagement and participation mechanisms to allow civil society actors to access, influence, manage and monitor funding.